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ABSTRACT: In recent years, discussions of Buddhist ethics have increasingly drawn upon 
the concepts and tools of modern ethical theory, not only to compare Buddhist perspectives 
with Western moral theories, but also to assess the meta-ethical implications of Buddhist 
texts and their philosophical context.  Philosophers aiming to defend the Madhyamaka 
framework in particular – its ethics and soteriology along with its logic and epistemology – 
have recently attempted to explain its combination of moral commitment and philosophical 
scepticism by appealing to various forms of meta-ethical anti-realism.  This paper argues 
that those attempts do not succeed, even in their own terms.  Their emphasis on universal 
compassion, among other features of their approaches, is difficult to explain normatively so 
long as it is embedded within an anti-realist framework.  Soteriological values – such as 
enlightenment and liberation – also seem to require a realist account of their normativity.  
Though many Buddhist philosophers disagree, there is at least one form of Buddhist 
philosophy, that of the Yogācāra school, that can be interpreted as articulating a meta-
ethical realism of the kind that the broader Mahāyāna tradition (if not other Buddhist 
traditions as well) seems to require.  In closing, I consider some of the implications of 
clarifying this meta-ethical background for the prospects of fruitful work in comparative 
ethical theory. 
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Whenever a contemporary moral theory is used to interpret the ethical reflections of 
an ancient non-Western religious or philosophical tradition, there are sceptical 
responses, often directed at the very idea of superimposing a ‘theory’ – let alone a 
non-indigenous theory – on complex and heterogeneous ancient writings. This 
scepticism can be even more acute when it is proposed that an ancient school of 
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thought may best be viewed through the lenses of meta-ethics.  Whether it should be 
called ‘Western’ or not, meta-ethics is arguably even more modern than ‘moral 
theory’, with its terms and methods defined mainly within the technical framework(s) 
of modern analytic philosophy.  Nonetheless, I shall argue here that meta-ethics, in a 
broad and generic sense, is central to important philosophical threads in several 
ancient Buddhist traditions.  I will also argue that the few Buddhist ethicists who have 
recently begun to address meta-ethics take it in a direction that pulls away from some 
key Buddhist themes and philosophical emphases – for better or worse, although it so 
happens that the anti-realist views they favour are beset by internal tensions that 
ultimately, I contend, lead to insurmountable philosophical difficulties.  But before 
advancing claims about what would qualify as ‘key Buddhist themes’, it will be 
important to reflect on some of the divergences and convergences that have marked 
debates within some of the Buddhist traditions that will concern us here. 
 Views differ, among Buddhists, about which discourses or texts offer the most 
definitive accounts of how the Buddha reached and interpreted his enlightenment, and 
how his subsequent vocation emerged from that experience.  In particular, the 
recounting of his decision to teach and assist others, rather than remain in solitary 
bliss, is interpreted differently in different traditions.  (I shall return to these 
interpretive divergences in a moment.)  Nonetheless, echoing various well-known 
discourses, both Theravāda and Mahāyāna traditions treat concern for the welfare of 
others as a brahmavihara – as something that, whatever else this phrase implies, is 
good, valuable, admirable, and worthy of aspiration. 
Buddhist ethicists have increasingly shifted from debating how to formulate 
Buddhist altruism as a moral theory to debating the meta-ethics of both moral theories 
and their own moral beliefs.  As some Buddhist philosophers had done in other 
contexts (in epistemology for instance), they now address not only the practical and 
theoretical forms that a Buddhist ethics of altruism might take, but also a range of 
complex meta-theoretical questions, such as: Does the insight gained through 
bodhicitta capture a conventional truth or an ultimate truth? Can a belief about the 
morally required scope of altruism count as any kind of truth (in the absence of either 
a platonist metaphysics or an epistemology of rational requirements)? And if not, 
what is going on when Buddhists or others seek to convince someone of the value of 
precepts and other moral ideals?  When it is suggested that there is neither truth nor 
ontology at stake because the value is of a practical nature (e.g., therapeutic or 
instrumental), sceptics will press other questions. What could account for such 
‘practical’ value if this value does not stand in relation to something that is ultimately 
valuable and that can explain why certain courses of action have more practical value 
than others?  And what could justify any talk of such value, if it turned out that it is 
not objectively true that the intended result would be good or valuable per se? 
  These meta-ethical concerns – whether expressed by Buddhists or sceptics – are 
not primarily about the role of generalist moral principles in Buddhist ethics, and 
need not concern the authority of canonical ethical pronouncements. Moreover, these 
concerns are not about the risks and rewards of moral persuasion – they are not meant 
to raise the question of whether efforts to ‘convince’ others may lead to dangerously 
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conceited forms of moralizing.
1
  Rather, these are questions about how the status of 
moral teachings is affected by an objective presence or absence of distinctively moral 
facts that would make it true that something is valuable or worthwhile, or that some 
course of action is justified. 
The central question about what role, if any, a robust notion of truth plays in the 
understanding and assessment of moral claims is at the heart of the debate over 
‘moral realism’, and has been central in Western philosophy since G.E. Moore, if not 
since David Hume.  Arguably this question, in a somewhat different form, has 
accompanied discussions of the universal/particular distinction, even as far back as 
Plato (in fact, especially in contexts where that distinction was construed in a Platonic 
vein, i.e. where the paradigmatic universal was the form of ‘the Good’).  It remains an 
underexplored question, though, whether ancient Buddhist debates about the 
distinction between ultimate and conventional truth may have had equally significant 
implications for how Buddhists thought about moral claims and moral insights.
2
 
 Casual readers of Buddhist texts might presume that the Dharma is replete with 
normative truths, given the recurring theme of ‘noble truths’ concerning the right path 
to an ultimate soteriological goal (a paramartha – sometimes meaning ultimate 
purpose as well as ultimate truth).  But, apart from relatively uncontested claims 
about the practical efficacy of precept observance, doubts and denials are common 
among Buddhist philosophers, regarding more elevated claims about an ultimate 
intrinsic value in precepts, virtues, social engagement or even soteriology itself. 
 Those doubts may be traceable to the earliest texts in the Buddhist tradition.  
Canonical sources state that the Buddha was initially unsure whether he owed it to 
                                                 
1
 Outside of meta-ethics, moral realism is often assumed to involve some such conceit.  But meta-
ethicists are generally careful about distinguishing moral realism from moral dogmatism (let alone any 
kind of ‘moral imperialism’), and often distinguish it from any vindication of even a modest capacity 
for moral knowledge.  Like Plato, with his realism about universals, or Moore, with his realism about 
axiology, one can be a moral realist, on purely meta-ethical grounds, without claiming to know which 
norms or principles are correct.  With this in mind, it may even be that the robust moral realist is least 
likely to adopt such dangerous conceits; cf. Cuneo (2007, 16).  By contrast, consider what – if anything 
– would restrain a relativist or an emotivist from trying to impose their moral norms, albeit while 
conscious that these norms have no epistemic authority.  This latter consciousness need not restrain 
them, since they see no reason to treat restraint (or anything else, including even a principle of 
epistemically informed modesty) as having any moral authority. 
2
 Since talk of ‘moral truth’ can sometimes sound narrow or parochial, I will often speak in what 
follows of the broader category of ‘normative truths’.  The category of normative truths is actually 
broader in one way, but narrower in another way, than most uses of ‘moral truth’.  Normative truths 
may include truths about epistemic, ethical, aesthetic or other reasons.  In what follows, I will be 
referring to ethical reasons, but since these may have to do with values or ideals concerning bliss or 
eudaimonia, rather than moral obligation, this usage is still broader than ‘moral’ (and notably includes 
soteriological matters).  On the other hand, insofar as some think that ‘moral truths’ could be truths 
about which actions fall under certain social standards or customs, then the present use of ‘normative 
truth’ is narrower, since such truths primarily involve an assessment of the customs themselves, or of 
other fundamental ethical criteria.  (This also stands in contrast to a common usage of ‘normative’ in 
the social sciences, where the term is often used to refer to actual rather than ideal norms.)  A truth 
about the relation between an action-type and a custom, on the other hand, would generally be 
descriptive, not normative. 
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others to reveal the insights he had gained (Gethin 2008, 186), raising the possibility 
that moral questions of that kind are left unanswered even in the midst of complete 
enlightenment, or even the possibility that there are no moral truths at that ultimate 
level of truth.  Canonical discourses also highlight the simile of the raft (Gethin 2008, 
160-61), which was sometimes deployed to portray moral precepts as tools rather 
than intrinsically important norms (as hypothetical rather than categorical 
imperatives, so to speak).  In the Mahāyāna tradition, the noble truths are sometimes 
said to be no more than conventional truths; and the precepts are taken to be 
dispensable for bodhisattvas.  Even nirvāṇa is sometimes said to be a lesser goal than 
that of engaged wisdom, a wisdom that includes knowing that the importance of 
being enlightened is no different than the importance of recognizing quotidian norms 
and expectations (a wisdom known as advayajñāna and/or samatājñāna 3 ).  
Chan/Seon/Zen pronouncements can even be disparaging about goals, ideals and the 
kind of normative reflection that sees moral truth as somehow above and beyond 
mundane descriptive truths (Dumoulin 191-201; 253-255).
4
 
 All this raises several large questions, at least two of which are too large for a 
single paper.  Those two overarching questions are: Do Buddhist philosophers in all 
major traditions tend to reject moral realism?  And, if all or even most do accept some 
form of moral anti-realism, can they coherently integrate moral reflection into 
Buddhist philosophy, given that the vast majority do see first-order ethics as an 
important part of Buddhist thought and practice?  The first is a question of 
interpretation; the second a question of philosophical assessment.  Here it is easy to 
narrow the scope of our discussion, for present purposes, by considering the fairly 
limited – because only recent – literature on Buddhist views in meta-ethics.  These 
recent forays favor moral anti-realism, while defending the practice of Buddhist 
ethics.  In light of the latter stance, I scrutinize (in Section I) how they propose to 
dispense with moral realism, and argue (in Section II) that they cannot – or at any 
rate, cannot do so consistently.  In the last section, I turn to consider the question of 
whether all traditions of Buddhist philosophy face similar problems. 
 In the latter half of the paper, I also consider the implications of moral realism for 
comparative ethical theory.  Moral realism, like anti-realism, is a meta-theory – or 
rather, a family of meta-ethical theories.  Ethical theories, by contrast, are based on 
general normative claims (and some are based on a single normative claim; e.g. some 
forms of utilitarianism are based on a single ‘utility principle’).  One major source of  
 
                                                 
3
 This latter term refers to one of the five forms of gnosis often attributed to buddhas, this one being, in 
Paul Williams’s gloss, “insight into the equality or sameness of all things” (Williams 2009, 102); other 
forms involve a kind of dynamic engagement with the world that stands in contrast with early 
conceptions of nirvāṇa. 
4
 Dale Wright (2006) suggests that the Zen tradition may have even less interest in morality than this, 
often marginalizing conventional as well as ultimate moral values.  There will not be space here for 
further discussion of these issues in the Japanese context; but it is worth noting that James Shields 
(2011) has recently argued that some of – what he too sees as – the moral limitations of Japanese Zen 
can be overcome via a turn to Madhyamaka-inspired philosophy of language (Shields 2011, 65; cf. 
157).  My arguments here will raise some doubts about the philosophical viability of that proposal. 
28 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 4.2 (2013)  DAVIS 
 
debate within Buddhist ethics has been the series of recent attempts at finding a close 
fit between a familiar ethical theory and one or another Buddhist moral perspective.
5
  
Some argue that these attempts are futile, because rather than offering general 
principles, Buddhism proposes – they suggest – a kind of ethical particularism.6  
There will not be space here for a full discussion of what the particularist 
interpretation might imply (if anything) at the meta-ethical level.  Many would insist, 
though, that insofar as particularism is a normative view, it occupies a certain level of 
discourse along with other ethical theories, and only with (normative) ethical theories.  
Since this is not the level of meta-ethics, we should expect particularism and moral 
realism to be compatible.
7
  A moral realist interpretation of Buddhist ethics need not 
encourage, then, any efforts to shoehorn its ideals and precepts into the framework of 
a generalist moral theory.  Nonetheless, arguably moral realism would have at least 
one spillover implication, namely that generalist moral theories are at least worth 
comparing as candidates for moral truth(s), alongside more complex forms of ethical 
pluralism and particularism.  And if some forms of Buddhist ethics turn out to be 
committed to some kind of moral realism, this might vindicate the kind of 
comparative ethical theory of which Buddhist particularists tend to be suspicious.  
There is no single theoretical interpretation of Buddhist ethics that can be vindicated 
by the meta-ethical inquiries undertaken here;
8
 but there is some prospect of a 
vindication of comparative work that traces parallels between Western ethical 
theories and Buddhist traditions of ethical thought.
9
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., Keown (2001), Clayton (2006), Siderits (2006), and Goodman (2009). 
6
 E.g. Hallisey (1996), and Barnhart (2012, 29-33); cf. Velez de Cea (2004).  Without presenting it as 
an interpretation of Buddhist ethics, Jay Garfield (2000) defends some aspects of a form of moral 
particularism. 
7
 Jonathan Dancy (2000 & 2004) has famously defended both views; but I know of no Buddhist 
ethicist who does, and on the contrary, Buddhist particularists often seem sceptical about moral 
realism.  In any case, by defining moral realism in terms of moral facts (note the plural) – rather than in 
terms of ‘principle(s)’ or (e.g. Kantian) ‘law(s)’ – we avoid loading moral realism with a bias in favor 
of principle-oriented or theory-oriented generalism. 
8
 Not even the broadest sort of Kantian interpretation, and not even if a kind of ‘categoricity’ turns out 
to characterize the normative truths posited in the most promising forms of Buddhist meta-ethics (pace 
Mādhyamikas, as we will see shortly).  The partly Kantian interpretation I have explored elsewhere 
(Davis (2013)) gains no more support from Buddhist moral realism than a consequentialist or 
particularist interpretation would. 
9
 This comparative project has been challenged by Michael Barnhart (2012), who defends an 
‘indigenous approach’ to Buddhist ethics.  A critique of that approach should not necessarily target the 
particularism that he believes it favors, but rather the relativism with which his approach could easily 
become entangled – insofar as it seems not only to let every religious and philosophical tradition 
conceive of ethics in its own way (surely a positive thing, prima facie), but to let none be judged by a 
‘theory approach’, nor judged by any approach, perhaps, that would be conceptually available to all 
cultures.  However, I should emphasize that my doubts about Buddhist anti-realism are not motivated 
by a wish to vindicate comparative ethical theory; the doubts stand on their own. 
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1. MORAL ANTI-REALISM IN THE MADHYAMAKA REFLECTIONS  
OF FINNIGAN, TANAKA AND GOODMAN 
 
Discussions of Buddhist ethics have sometimes noted a worry about a potential gap 
between the ‘is’ revealed by yathā-bhūta-dassana / darśana (‘seeing things as they 
are’) and the ‘oughts’ associated with the fourth noble truth (that we ought to reduce 
suffering, and that, among other things, precepts against harming others ought to be 
followed).
10
  Rarely, though, have writers on Buddhist ethics attempted to scrutinize 
or analyze ‘ought’ or related concepts (such as kusala) in ways that are overtly meta-
ethical.  But recently, Buddhist philosophers have begun to tackle meta-ethics more 
explicitly and more directly.  For the first time, for example, a Buddhist philosopher 
has addressed what is explicitly called ‘Buddhist meta-ethics’ – in a paper by that 
very name, by Bronwyn Finnigan (Finnigan 2010). 
  Finnigan touches on the moral realism/anti-realism debate while focusing on 
certain other problems that I will discuss briefly by way of a prelude to that debate.  I 
believe her paper shows how central this debate is, albeit indirectly; meanwhile 
elsewhere she addresses the key problems surrounding moral realism directly – in a 
couple of papers co-authored with Koji Tanaka.  Before turning to those papers, we 
can start to focus our attention on these problems by pinpointing where they become 
relevant within the broader set of concerns that Finnigan calls ‘meta-ethics’. 
The main problem that Finnigan highlights in “Buddhist Meta-Ethics” is 
principally a problem in the philosophy of action.  This is the problem of how an 
enlightened being whose mind operates non-conceptually can act according to norms 
or ideals.  As I shall suggest, it is similar to problems about the differences between 
the agency of a perfect phronimos and the agency of merely continent agents – 
problems much discussed by scholars of Aristotelian and Stoic writings on 
psychology and ethics.  Nonetheless, Finnigan is right that moral psychology, 
                                                 
10
 Noted, for example, in relation to the Theravāda context by Kalupahana (1995, 37-46) and in a 
Mahāyāna context by Williams (1998, 104-05).  Cf. Burton (2004, 55-61).  This worry is often 
salutary.  In what follows, I am merely suggesting that the is-ought conundrum does not cut to the 
heart of the matter in meta-ethics.  One way I take the worry to be salutary partly explains why one 
feature of Buddhist soteriology is largely absent from this paper – namely, the role of karmic causation 
in Buddhists’ pre-nirvanic deliberations.  Karmic prospects might be construed as ‘reasons’ for moral 
action.  But primarily, in those traditions that emphasize them, they represent truths about causal 
explanation, not moral reasons.  It may be to the credit of those who appeal to the moral lessons of 
Jātaka tales (whether Theravāda or Mahāyāna) that they often treat it as an open question whether 
negative karmic results should deter a bodhisattva from doing what is impartially justifiable in a moral 
dilemma, rather than what is optimal in terms of his or her own karma.  In any case, truths about karma 
are not strictly normative truths; if there are truths about karma, they are truths about causal processes 
(and while they may be deliberatively action-guiding for some, they are not inherently action-guiding 
for all – in the deliberative sense – and not always justifiably action-guiding, in that sense).  These 
would be truths about what will or would happen, not about what an agent ought to do; and I shall be 
arguing that even though these truths do not entail normative truths, that is not necessarily a problem 
for the idea of normative truth. 
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epistemology and metaphysics come together in these discussions, and in some quite 
unique ways in the Buddhist context. 
Not every intersection of ethics and metaphysics will be a site for meta-ethical 
debate, however.  For example, to show that anattā/anātman has implications for 
impartiality and the importance of compassion, one needs to combine ethics, 
metaphysics and epistemology; but rather than posing meta-ethical questions, such 
efforts typically presuppose some meta-ethical framework or other.  By contrast, 
Finnigan’s problem in “Buddhist Meta-Ethics” does raise a key meta-ethical question.  
The problem is that more than one paradigm of Buddhist epistemology emphasize 
non-conceptual experience, whereas a plausible framework for analyzing moral 
deliberation and moral choice would highlight the conceptual abilities of the 
enlightened agent.  Finnigan proposes to bring these together by enriching the 
conceptual resources of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology while reducing the conceptual 
requirements of moral agency; and this project does raise the question of what form a 
moral belief must take as the output of moral deliberation. 
I suggest, though, that Finnigan’s proposal, which is partly psychological and 
partly meta-ethical, should be considered in light of more purely meta-ethical 
considerations.  The merits of her proposal may turn out to hinge on whether a 
particular form of moral realism is sound or not.  Over the past twenty years or so, 
one of the most important approaches to defending meta-ethical realism has been 
John McDowell’s Neo-Aristotelian moral realism.11  On his view, for an agent to act 
correctly, she must act on the basis of a moral belief (though often a particular rather 
than a general belief), and that belief must be true.  Roughly speaking, the main 
Aristotelian premise is that a virtuous agent acts for a reason, a reason she can 
conceptualize and understand, whether before or after the action; and the moral realist 
premise (which may or may not also be Aristotelian) is that the validity of the reason 
rests on an objective normative truth, i.e. a truth about its justificatory status. 
If this Neo-Aristotelian moral realism is correct, then we should follow Finnigan 
in adapting the radical intuitionism of the epistemologies she considers (such as 
Candrakīrti’s and Dharmakīrti’s) to the demands of a moral psychology that construes 
enlightened action as norm-guided in something like the way Damien Keown (2001) 
outlines, albeit modified in the ways Finnigan suggests.  If this form of moral realism 
is not correct, however, it might well turn out that there are no meta-ethical 
considerations that could require us to revise their characterization of a buddha’s 
understanding, or any other characterization for that matter.
12
  What Finnigan is 
                                                 
11
 As represented by the essays in McDowell’s Mind, Value and Reality (1998).  In a closely related 
article, “How Can a Buddha Come to Act”, Finnigan acknowledges that the prospects for a view like 
McDowell’s may affect the outcome of her inquiry (Finnigan 2011, 154-55, n. 15).  Rather than 
“bearing only indirectly” (155) on the matter, however, it has a direct and decisive bearing; or so I 
shall argue. 
12
 This is certainly the case if both parts of McDowell’s view fail to hold, since abandoning the first 
idea – that a virtuous agent acts on the basis of a reason – would make it unnecessary to question the 
mysteriously spontaneous form of engagement that goes along with what I am calling ‘radical 
intuitionism’.  But more interestingly, the pressure to abandon the latter might also disappear even if 
only the second, objectivist part of McDowell’s view is judged untenable.  We may ask, without that 
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calling ‘meta-ethics’ would then be in no position to motivate or guide a reform of 
epistemology or a remodelling of moral psychology.  And in the specific case of a 
non-deliberative, purely intuitive buddha who nonetheless acts – if not according to 
plans and purposes then at least in some patterned way – an esoteric or mystical 
understanding of such agency might be called for, without ethical or meta-ethical 
constraints coming into play.
13
 
With moral realism out of the picture, it will be hard to deny that whatever 
patterns of action a buddha may initiate, nothing about those patterns would call for 
justification.  That is, neither the decision-making processes nor the acts themselves 
would require, or even permit of, justification.  This would be true, at least, if neither 
McDowell’s nor any other form of moral realism could succeed in making sense of 
objective normative truths.  Until we address questions about normative truth directly, 
however, it should remain open whether some form of moral realism might be 
philosophically more cogent – and more consistent with key features of Buddhist 
ethics – than all known forms of anti-realism. (In section 3, I highlight some 
alternative realist approaches that rely less on the Aristotelian premises to which 
McDowell is committed.) 
In the meantime, it is unclear how grave a dilemma it is that Finnigan has 
uncovered.
14
  Part of the uncertainty we might have about this is due to an ambiguity 
between what would be required to describe a buddha’s actions and what would be 
required to explain their being justified.  Our ability to describe buddhahood is indeed 
likely to be limited, to put it mildly.  But our ability or inability to describe actions of 
the kind Finnigan is interested in (ethically guided actions) may be of little 
consequence if there is no place for justification or justifiability in a broader 
philosophy of action.  The issues Finnigan raises, which lie at the intersection of 
meta-ethics and the philosophy of action, depend on the deeper meta-ethical issue of 
whether there is any objective truth in claims about what is morally or ethically 
justified.
15
 
In fact, Finnigan herself expresses scepticism about the notion of objective 
justification in two essays coauthored with Koji Tanaka, thereby partially disarming, 
                                                                                                                                           
objectivism in place, why it would be important to explain even the mere possibility of structured 
decision-making.  Some would say that this possibility does not depend on the existence of objective 
action-guiding values; but the defence of even a minimal form of intentionality may ultimately depend 
on a realist conception of normativity (as, e.g., Wedgwood (2007) argues). 
13
 The notion of a ‘pattern’ may itself be problematic here, but some would concede at the very least 
that a buddha’s actions would be patterned so as to allow a response to the pattern of suffering around 
him or her. 
14
 Though, admittedly, similar problems are also emphasized (independently) by Paul Williams (1998) 
and David Burton (2004, 82-86). 
15
 This contention has an unexpected affinity, I believe, with Garfield’s point, in his critique of 
Finnigan’s “How Can a Buddha Come to Act” (Garfield 2011), that Finnigan presupposes a 
Davidsonian model of reasons as combinations of belief and desire.  Philosophers will disagree about 
whether Davidson should be characterized as a realist or an anti-realist about non-instrumental 
practical reasons.  Insofar as a case can be made that his view is anti-realist, and insofar as Garfield has 
correctly identified a key assumption in Finnigan’s approach, Garfield’s assessment resonates with 
mine – even though his diagnosis of the ultimately problematic upshot may be different. 
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perhaps, the dilemma she considers in “Buddhist Meta-Ethics”.  In doing so, 
however, she exposes at least two other dilemmas, which I describe in detail in the 
next section.  Before outlining those problems, I describe their approach and compare 
it to another Madhyamaka-inspired approach, that of Charles Goodman in his recent 
book The Consequences of Compassion. 
In a contribution to the ‘Cowherds’ literature, an essay entitled “Ethics for 
Mādhyamikas”, Finnigan and Tanaka begin with a modest interpretive claim.  While 
acknowledging that Mādhyamikas recognize precepts and virtues, they claim that 
“Mādhyamikas do not address the question of whether they are justified in holding 
these precepts or virtues” (2011b, 221).  “Madhyamaka ethics,” they say, “is 
concerned with practice rather than justification” (227); it “is distinctive in its explicit 
focus on the fulfillment of ethical precepts in conduct rather than their justification” 
(227).  Citing the Prāsaṅgika philosopher Patsab, they explain: 
 
[A] Prāsaṅgika is committed to a complete “suspension of normativity”... This is not to 
abandon all ethical precepts, however.  Rather, precepts function as “pragmatic 
guidelines on how to go on living one’s life”... What is the distinction between pragmatic 
guidelines for living, which do not have normative force, and precepts with normative 
force?  Normativity is grounded in justification, which in turn depends upon 
argumentation... [But] the activity of justifying ethical precepts is not a practice on the 
bodhisattva path.  (2011b, 226) 
 
These initial claims do not explicitly deny that ethical justification is possible, or that 
moral truth exists in a robust objective form.  They suggest a modest position, which 
might be called ‘meta-ethical quietism’.  But as we shall see, Finnigan and Tanaka go 
further, endorsing meta-ethical (and moral) anti-realism, at least as a framework for 
Madhyamaka thought.  (It will be important later to keep in mind that there is a 
potentially misleading assumption in the claim that “justification... depends upon 
argumentation”.  For some moral realists, including Plato and G.E. Moore, the 
possibility of objective truths about justification does not and cannot depend on 
anyone’s ability to argue persuasively in favor of such truths.  Perhaps the purest 
form of moral realism would say that moral truths are independent of anyone’s and 
everyone’s beliefs and desires, like mathematical truths; and if some mathematical 
truths are bound to be beyond our ability even to formulate them, then a fortiori they 
would be beyond our ability to reason about their soundness, let alone demonstrate 
them.  On a similar view of moral and other normative truths, there would be no 
guarantee that we could conclusively establish any specific truths of this ‘external’ 
kind.) 
Finnigan and Tanaka constructively suggest that their Madhyamaka approach can 
“expand the domain of ethics to incorporate a concern with the role of an agent’s 
attitudes, dispositions, motivations, and phenomenology for the very possibility of 
ethical practice and the perfection of virtue” (Finnigan & Tanaka 2011b, 227).  
Meanwhile, they draw critical conclusions as well.  At first tentatively, they suggest 
that the Madhyamaka approach involves “an implicit recognition of the limitations of 
justification” (227).  But this recognition cuts deeper.  They argue that there cannot be 
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the kind of non-relative justification with which I began at the outset of this paper: 
 
[C]ertain strategies [may be] unavailable for justifying ethical precepts.  For instance, 
[Mādhyamikas] would not be able to appeal to actual properties or states of affairs in the 
world to function as truthmakers.  From the standpoint of the ultimate truth, there are no 
actual properties or states of affairs in the world that could function in this way... Even if 
ethical precepts cannot ultimately be justified, might they be justified conventionally or 
as conventions? (223) ... [O]ne might say, while there are no real, ultimately existing 
properties that can ultimately justify the bodhisattva precepts, these precepts are 
nonetheless conventionally justified in the context of the bodhisattva path (224) ... The 
point is that, if we opt for ethical contextualism, the reasons Mādhyamika thinkers can 
provide for the value of the precepts on the bodhisattva path will not have justificatory 
status outside of this context. (Finnigan & Tanaka 2011b, 225) 
 
Though perhaps not as radical as moral non-cognitivism, the view that emerges here 
combines two paradigms of meta-ethical anti-realism: error theory and relativism.  At 
the level of putative ultimate truth, there are no moral or ethical truths; at this level, 
an error theory applies.  It is erroneous, according to this Madhyamaka approach, to 
suppose there are properties that could explain such truths.  At the level of 
conventional truth, a form of moral relativism applies.  The frames of reference to 
which valid claims are relative are not necessarily cultural on this approach, as in the 
best-known varieties of relativism, but would include doctrinal systems, paths, 
methods and conceptual frameworks – perhaps, indeed, with no limits on what could 
constitute a relevant (and, so to speak, exculpatory) reference frame.
16
 
One feature of this relativism is its holding that a putative reason for an action can 
be assessed in terms of the action’s conduciveness to a given path or end, but ends 
themselves cannot be rationally assessed per se.  Citing Carnap’s pragmatist 
epistemology in another essay, Finnigan and Tanaka develop this form of reasons-
internalism: 
 
[C]onventional grounds [for the choice of a method of communication include] 
efficiency, fruitfulness and simplicity... For the community whose members aspire 
toward buddhahood... the question may be the efficacy of what people say and do toward 
the achievement of awakening.  Thus, the important issue here has to do with the 
“planning and optimisation of the future” of saṃgha... So a reform of conventional truths 
is a possibility.  Indeed, which conventions best meet our interests and purposes is the 
‘ultimate’ question. (Finnigan & Tanaka 2011a, 188) 
 
We can presume that ‘reform’ here means improvement, and not just change.  
                                                 
16
 Referring to Patsab – the same Prāsaṅgika figure that Finnigan and Tanaka cite – Georges Dreyfus 
concludes that such an open-ended relativism may indeed follow from this approach to Madhyamaka 
analysis (Dreyfus 2011, 112).  The open-endedness as to eligible reference frames makes this 
relativism even more radical than the already problematic, but better-known, forms of historical and 
cultural relativism.  After all, on this approach, no normative principle could legitimately constrain the 
proliferation of reference frames (each of which insulates adherents from external moral or evaluative 
judgment, in a sense ‘exculpating’ anything they do – though of course not vindicating it either). 
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However, on this approach, nothing can make a reform ultimately a change for the 
better, so the only guidelines in play are beliefs – or intuitions – about preferred 
changes, and there is no limit to how beliefs, preferences and conventions might 
evolve.  Meanwhile, the use of ‘ultimate’ in Finnigan and Tanaka’s last remark just 
reiterates that there is no scope, in their view, for rational or objective assessment of 
conventions except relative to ‘interests and purposes’.  (There is allegedly nothing 
more ultimate than the latter form of assessment, so Finnigan and Tanaka call this 
relativized assessment ‘ultimate’, though they presumably mean just that it is the only 
form of evaluative judgment that is not subjective in the way that our ‘interests and 
purposes’ are). 
In the next section, I offer a critique of this form of ethical relativism.  Meanwhile 
we have not considered the first-order content of Buddhist ethics, other than noting 
the central importance of compassion as a key element.  Like Finnigan and Tanaka, 
we would do best here to remain neutral on whether there is some framework for 
ethical theory that would capture all the key elements of Buddhist ethics.  It is worth 
comparing their meta-ethical approach, however, to one suggested by Charles 
Goodman, who does defend a particular ethical theory as a basis for Buddhist ethics – 
namely, universalist perfectionist consequentialism.
17
  Like Finnigan and Tanaka, 
Goodman gives Madhyamaka sources a privileged place, but he develops a detailed 
analysis of the consequentialism that he takes to be a fundamental criterion of 
rightness.  I will not be disputing either his analysis or his belief that Buddhist ethics 
should have a robust criterion of moral rightness.  But doubts about the role of 
justification, similar to the ones noted above, arise when we consider Goodman’s 
remarks on meta-ethics. 
Goodman refers to three levels of compassion, where consequentialist 
considerations can operate consciously in decision-making at the first two levels, and 
then be transcended psychologically at the third level while still playing a normative 
role in impersonally justifying what an advanced bodhisattva does.  “The third form 
of compassion,” he suggests, “depends on a realization of emptiness. Those who have 
it do not believe any ethical theory at all; indeed, they are not committed to any 
theory about anything” (Goodman 2009, 6).  As he illustrates with famous stories 
about Vimalakīrti, the moral criterion recedes from this higher level of consciousness, 
no longer posing obstacles to the bodhisattva’s unlimited compassion; and yet, the 
criterion continues to distinguish right from wrong, whether anyone consciously 
notices or not (2009, 114).  This latter qualification may seem to presuppose moral 
realism, but the Madhyamaka approach that Goodman invokes once again puts this in 
doubt.  If the most enlightened being is “not committed to any theory about 
anything”, this implies that he or she is neither consciously committed, nor indirectly 
committed by virtue of some theory being the correct normative explanation of how 
he or she acts (i.e. by virtue of such a theory capturing the justification, even when it 
is not employed or even thought about).  The only reason for no commitment of the 
                                                 
17
 Goodman (2009, 41) prefers the term character consequentialism; and in any case, these terms 
should not lead us to overlook that his theory is in fact a universalist value-pluralist consequentialism. 
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latter kind being possible would be that there is no true moral theory, and perhaps 
more generally, no normative truths at all.  The meta-ethical turn has once again left 
us with a moral error theory, except perhaps with regard to relativized moral claims – 
and even if Goodman’s bodhisattva would not invoke that theory either (i.e. 
relativism), a Buddhist philosopher would seem to have no other option at this point. 
Goodman’s overall position is potentially more precarious than that of Finnigan 
and Tanaka, insofar as he defends a robust criterion of rightness, whereas they 
seemingly have the option of simple moral nihilism.  Goodman builds an edifice, so 
to speak, but in a phantom city; whereas Finnigan and Tanaka seem to have less 
invested in foundational ethical theory (they might agree that there are only phantom 
cities; but they abstain from theory-building, despite having carte blanche to do so on 
the clean slate that such ‘cities’ offer).  It seems doubtful, though, that they would bite 
the nihilist bullet.  And if not, it seems that they, along with most Buddhist ethicists, 
will need some explanation for why some actions are justified and some are not.  If a 
proposed meta-ethical framework ends up undermining that distinction, however, 
then philosophically (if not soteriologically) there will be at least a couple of prima 
facie problems to address here.
18
 
 
2. COMPASSION (KARUNĀ) AND TWO PROBLEMS  
FOR MADHYAMAKA ANTI-REALISM 
The two problems I shall introduce here pose challenges, I believe, to both Finnigan 
and Tanaka on the one hand, and Goodman on the other (and possibly several other 
Mādhyamika philosophers as well19).  But the first one I take up is perhaps most acute 
for someone with robust normative commitments of the kind Goodman accepts, and 
in particular for someone who considers compassion (karuṇā) to have genuine moral 
and soteriological value.
20
  The second one will seem most acute for Finnigan and 
Tanaka since I will show how their own philosophical framework requires a more 
robust conception of normativity than they allow for.  The first sets out from the 
prospect of ethical agreement on certain first-order concerns (such as the value of 
                                                 
18
 As I note below, I do not have in mind a practical or social problem such as a prospect of 
increasingly nihilistic attitudes in society and the perceived dangers of such attitudes.  I shall be 
discussing only theoretical problems here. 
19
 For another example of someone who is in effect a Mādhyamika meta-ethicist, or at any rate meta-
soteriologist, see Huntington – who develops a similar combination of error theory regarding ultimate 
truth and relativism regarding conventional truth (Huntington 1989, 10-15; 125-129) ; and among 
historic figures, there is Patsab (if Dreyfus’s conclusion above is correct), and Candrakīrti (if 
Huntington’s interpretation is correct). 
20
 Garfield (forthcoming) makes a cogent case for leaving the term karuṇā untranslated, noting its 
conceptual distinctiveness in light of the more passive connotation of ‘compassion’.  However, my use 
of the term ‘compassion’ should be harmless in the present context, since I will focus more on the 
disvalue of one way of rejecting this whole family of moral emotions (the kind of rejection that is 
based on an extreme form of egoism), rather than on the positive value(s) concerned – whose value, I 
note below, can seem torn between a direct and an indirect form (where the indirect form serves 
something else of intrinsic value, namely general well-being). 
36 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 4.2 (2013)  DAVIS 
compassion); the second scrutinizes the higher-order implications of Madhyamaka 
theoretical reflections on ethics. 
The first problem arises when we consider how widespread is the intuitive moral 
approval of compassion, and when we scrutinize (a) what sort of deficiency is 
typically attributed to those who shun this value (and/or suppress related emotions 
like empathy), and (b) how differently this ‘deficiency’ would have to be 
characterized according to realist and anti-realist accounts of the normative basis of 
moral approval.
21
  To sharpen the problem, though, we can both extend the scope of 
likely agreement on the relevant value (and the scope of agreement about the 
corresponding deficiency) and concretize one instance of such agreement with 
reference to the Buddhist context. 
There are some who regard the value of compassion as overly sentimental and 
weak, and some others who see this value as dispensable because they regard it as 
utterly subjective.  It seems safe to say, though, that it is an even smaller minority of 
people who ever seriously entertain the idea of total rational egoism – an egoism so 
total that it not only regards the only justified actions as those that serve the agent’s 
interests, but also regards the indulgence of moral emotions like compassion as 
counterproductive and thus condemnable.  (I speak here of beliefs, not patterns of 
actual behavior; and we may assume that even fewer people would regularly make 
decisions based on strictly egoistic criteria.
22
)  To offer a concrete instance of the 
countervailing consensus, we might – aptly enough – consider the global community 
of Buddhists.  Among Buddhists, there may be some who accept a form of 
psychological egoism that explains human action in terms of widespread illusions 
about ego and personal gain.  But there are presumably next to none who would 
accept so-called rational egoism – that is, egoism as a normative framework that is 
used to guide all of one’s conduct.  The consensus that rejects this view within the 
Buddhist context could hardly be shaken, meanwhile, by differing interpretations of 
anattā/anātman.23 
                                                 
21
 I put this in terms of those who shun or suppress compassion, rather than in terms of those who lack 
the capacity for compassion, since it would be reasonable to refrain from moral assessments of the 
latter – not to mention that it may be the compassionate thing to do.  (Compassion might also require 
sparing the former; and arguably they should be spared assessments involving blame, but not 
necessarily the kind of assessment that would cite a deficiency that results in the suffering of both the 
egoists themselves and those around them.) 
22
 To fully support this, we would of course need empirical evidence – albeit of such complex kinds 
that I could not do justice to it here.  Prinz (2007, 79-84) and Baron-Cohen (2011, 19-41) cite recent 
evidence showing how psychologically unrealistic any egoistic explanatory framework would be, 
except perhaps to explain some exceedingly rare cases.  Anecdotally, we might remark on encounters 
with devotees of the writings of Ayn Rand, who sometimes express something close to a rational-
egoist view; but anyone who has discussed ethics with such devotees will also be familiar with the 
limits of their egoism both in theory and in practice.  A more interesting example, along similar lines, 
would be Nietzscheans – and I discuss that perspective below. 
23
 I know of no evidence that any tathāgathagarbha-oriented text – for example any of those that 
appear to treat Buddha-nature as an exception to anātman – departs from the traditional emphasis on 
compassion and altruism (i.e. karuṇā, dāna, bodhicitta, etc.).  It is true, as Premasiri (1997) and 
Goodman (2009) note, that some non-Mahāyāna traditions have been accused of explaining moral 
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In any case, the point here is not just that so few people, inside or outside of 
Buddhist communities, would contemplate adopting rational egoism; it is not even 
just that so many consider this sort of attitude to indicate a personal, spiritual and 
social deficiency.  Indeed, there is a risk that a survey of general opinion would make 
such a deficiency seem to be merely one of being out of step with deeply entrenched 
expectations.  The key point is rather that there is evidently also a cognitive 
deficiency in anyone who endorses rational egoism; such a person is blind in certain 
ways – not only blind to the feelings and interests of others, but also blind to certain 
moral truths.
24
  Though this is not the occasion to fully defend this claim, some 
considerations that support it will emerge in what follows. 
We can safely minimize, for present purposes, the complications that arise from 
distinguishing how rational egoism would impact behavior, compared to how it 
would impact thoughts and emotions.  Some who are attracted to egoism might argue 
(i) that guiding our decisions and actions by an egoist criterion leaves some scope for 
allowing compassion at a purely emotive level, and (ii) that strictly speaking, egoism 
does not rule out compassion in any case, but simply requires that a rational agent 
weigh the costs and benefits of compassionate responses in each relevant situation.  
Arguably, though, the prioritizing of cost-benefit analysis simply precludes the true 
exercise of compassion, and as for (i), a purely emotive form of attention would 
always fall short in a cost-benefit analysis, because without a potential connection to 
decision and action, it will strike the egoist as a waste of mental effort.  It is safe to 
say, then, that rational egoism is incompatible with any kind of robust commitment to 
compassion as a virtue, value or ideal. 
Debating the merits and demerits of rational egoism, however, is part of first-
order ethics, and we are concerned with the implications of all this for meta-ethics.  If 
we grant that Buddhism is non-egoistic, and that Finnigan, Tanaka and Goodman 
illustrate this by vindicating compassion, what follows, regarding the nature of ethical 
‘vindication’?  Let us suppose that their advocacy of compassion could not just be a 
skillful means, or a device with other goals in mind.  It would then be a sincere effort 
to persuade others of the value of compassion.  I have noted that ethical justification 
does not depend on the scope for argumentation; rather, the nature of justification 
determines what is at stake when people do happen to engage in moral argument.  
Now, suppose these Buddhist philosophers were to offer their best arguments for the 
value of compassion, and suppose one of their interlocutors is a rational egoist.  In 
engaging with this viewpoint, they need not assume that they can successfully 
convince this person; they need only aim and hope to have a greater depth of insight 
on their side, and meanwhile make the best case they can.  And the key point is that 
the ‘best case’ cannot just be defined instrumentally in terms of attaining some goal 
                                                                                                                                           
norms in terms of egoist evaluative foundations.  Even if the accusation held up, however, this would 
not support the sort of normative framework just referred to; and in any case, the alleged foundations 
are presumed to coexist with strong forms of the anattā/anātman doctrine. 
24
 As the Pāli Canon puts it, the problem is not merely selfish craving, but also erroneous ‘view’ 
(diṭṭhi), in particular sakkāyadiṭṭhi (Burton 2004, 41; Gethin 1998, 73; cf. Webster 2005, 167 on the 
diṭṭhi of attavāda). 
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via the spread of belief in compassion
25
 (let alone in terms of some non-cognitive 
criterion such as emotive persuasiveness).  Rather, it must partly refer to the sort of 
case that presents compassion as being valuable per se.
26
 
It is important to be explicit about a key premise in the argument just offered.  
This premise deserves its own name – we can call it the Insufficiency of Skillful 
Means Thesis.  This is the thesis that not every ethical and soteriological claim or 
ideal or value can be wholly a skillful means.  It is compatible with this thesis, 
though, to grant that it is both actually true and often ethically justified that many 
doctrines and ‘ideals’ are wholly and exclusively skillful means.  It would also be 
compatible with accepting the thesis to hope that the moves we make in the more 
theoretical ‘language games’ (such as philosophy) would be not only correct in a non-
instrumental sense, but also skillful in certain ways that are independent of epistemic 
correctness.
27
  But C.W. Huntington (1989, 94), for example, goes too far when he 
argues that functioning as a skillful means is sufficient for a philosophical move to 
qualify as a philosophical insight (because, allegedly, there is nothing else for insight 
to do or to be).
28
  First of all, there is the problem of how we could accept his claim 
that ethical and philosophical insights are wholly and exclusively skillful means, 
given that this implies that his claim is itself merely a skillful means.  (The problem 
stems from its putative status as merely a skillful means; since the claim would no 
                                                 
25
 Unless they are content to shift the focus to the telic importance of overall well-being, thought of as 
something facilitated by – rather than constituted by – virtues such as compassion.  I consider this 
possibility below. 
26
 Someone might try to object that these philosophers would not have to defend claims about what is 
intrinsically valuable, since they could take the shorter route of denying any sort of ego that could be 
made the focus of egoism (in other words, appealing to anattā/anātman).  This would not work, 
though, against a Nietzschean egoist.  Even though Nietzsche can easily inspire a form of ‘rational’ 
egoism, he nonetheless rejects the metaphysics of diachronically continuous selfhood (see Nietzsche 
(1966), Beyond Good and Evil §§ 16-17) – much as Buddhists do.  In responding to this kind of 
egoism, it is hard to see what alternative Buddhists would have other than to say that Nietzsche has 
overlooked a kind of intrinsic value in the experiences of others, a value not dependent on Cartesian or 
Kantian conceptions of selfhood or will – overlooking all this, that is, as a result of his (poorly 
supported) moral anti-realism. 
27
 Finding Goodman’s defence of consequentialism plausible (despite interpretive concerns I express in 
“Traces of Consequentialism and Non-Consequentialism in Bodhisattva Ethics” (Davis 2013)), I 
would put even more emphasis than he does on skillful means (upāya) as a key element in a 
theoretically elaborated Buddhist ethics.  In any case, Mahāyāna reflections on the triad of compassion, 
wisdom and skillful means are profound and persuasive.  The question I raise here is only whether 
every philosophical insight could turn out to be wholly upāya. 
28
 I have already mentioned in n. 19 how Huntington (1989) generalizes this to cover all philosophical 
‘insight’; and in the case of the soteriology of cessation, he says “the concept of a goal is ultimately 
deconstructed along with any notion of a resolution to the analysis. This points to the important fact 
that even this most central concern of Buddhist doctrine must be seen as a tool of propaganda – one of 
the devices of skillful means” (1989, 94).  If this is the kind of mistake I take it to be, we might hesitate 
to ascribe it to the Madhyamaka tradition as a whole.  In fact, Matthew Kapstein (2001, 217) sees some 
evidence, in at least one Mādhyamika’s writings, of treating the soteriological goal’s value as based on 
ultimate truth – which would suggest an interesting contrast with the interpretations discussed above, 
in section I.  His textual evidence is rather slight, however, and it is not clear that he would construe 
Prajñākaramati’s view as realist, or even non-relativist. 
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longer be epistemically guided, an apt response would not be to philosophically 
assess the claim, but rather (at best) to appreciate its practical role, even though the 
former is what would be required before we could accept the claim in a way that suits 
its philosophical context.)  Secondly, we would be trapped in an infinite regress if we 
asked, of any skillful means, what purpose it serves – because any claim about the 
purpose would itself be a skillful means, and we would then have to ask about its own 
purpose, and so on. 
The question then becomes, how can we arrive at a proper understanding of the 
claim that compassion is valuable insofar as this claim cannot be merely a skillful 
means?  Apart from the ‘skillful’ uses to which it may be put, what would be the 
point in making this claim if – as the Mādhyamikas above contend – there is no truth 
of the matter as to whether compassion has intrinsic and objective value, or whether 
well-being (the loss of which calls for compassion) has intrinsic and objective value?  
If there can be no truth of the matter, then it would appear that the only point in 
making such a claim would indeed be instrumental (i.e. practically ‘skillful’).  But if 
we accept the Insufficiency of Skillful Means Thesis, the latter cannot be the case, and 
so truth will inevitably play a role here.  Moreover, it cannot just be conventional or 
relative truth, because those construals would reproduce the problems about how to 
identify the purposes served by such truths and about whether those purposes are 
themselves justified.  As I argue further in the next section, the robust realism that 
vindications of compassion seem to require is a realism about ultimate truth. 
It could indeed be argued that to treat compassion as having intrinsic value would 
be to fetishize something that should mainly serve to protect and promote the well-
being of sentient beings (something whose value may be immeasurable, but 
nonetheless derivative from this function).  If any of the Buddhist philosophers I have 
cited were to argue this, it would be understandable – but it would just transfer our 
critical reflections to a consideration of the normative status of well-being, and of the 
notion of objective truth about its intrinsic value.  It should be noted that it would be 
implicit in this argument itself that well-being has intrinsic value, as Goodman, at 
least, would agree.  But our critical reflections would then focus on how to make 
sense of the claim that something could have intrinsic value while not really having 
intrinsic value.  We would need to make sense, that is, of how the anti-realist can rule 
out ultimate value via that last qualification, while avoiding the kind of pure 
instrumentalism that Goodman rejects.  One suggestion would be that something can 
have ‘intrinsic’ value in a non-ultimate sense when, and because, some people imbue 
it with telic value (e.g. by seeking it for its own sake).  But this returns us to a 
relativism that invites the question of what purpose is served by their doing so, and 
prompts us to raise the question of whether such purposes can have real value within 
the parameters of this anti-realist suggestion.
29
  Without a role for ultimate normative 
                                                 
29
 Within these parameters, the valuer’s purpose can itself have ‘value’ if she forms a further purpose 
served by the first one; but the ensuing infinite regress sows doubt about whether any real value can be 
in play here.  Standard Western attempts to make this middle position work emphasize desiring (for-
own-sake) and a role for higher-order desires.  Apart from their failure even in the Western context, 
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truth, it looks like Buddhists may run out of options in meta-ethics that would do 
justice to the idea that ariyasukha (well-being) has a kind of value that dukkha does 
not. 
Some of the premises I have employed here would no doubt be resisted by 
defenders of Madhyamaka meta-ethics.
30
  But if we return to Finnigan and Tanaka’s 
essays, we notice that they make several meta-ethical claims that seem tacitly to 
invoke realist understandings of normativity.  The second major problem to consider, 
then, is endogenous to their work, rather than exogenous (as, perhaps, the intuition 
that rational egoism is simply false may be exogenous, although they clearly accept 
that embracing it would be a moral deficiency)
31
. 
If Finnigan and Tanaka were to accept the value-relativism that their reading of 
Madhyamaka ethics seems to involve, they would be committed to a schema along 
these lines: on one path or perspective, emptiness supports value x; on another path or 
perspective, it supports value y; on another, value z; and so on, where these values 
may be mutually incompatible.  Some of these values would be incompatible with 
compassion.  (Emptiness itself might be both conceived and valued differently from 
different perspectives, but I leave aside this added complexity for now.)  And there 
would be no uniquely correct normative implication of emptiness or its apprehension.  
However, guided by a traditional understanding of the bodhisattva path, they suggest 
the contrary: 
In Mahāyāna ethics, a bodhisattva is one who is actively altruistic or has fully activated 
bodhicitta.  At the heart of bodhicitta is a type of compassion (mahākaruṇā...) grounded 
in an apprehension of emptiness.  That is, in realizing the interdependence of all sentient 
beings... bodhisattvas extend their compassion equally to all sentient beings. (2011b, 229) 
 
Though they may not have intended to reintroduce a foundational notion of 
justification here, such a notion slips in, as indicated in the phrase ‘grounded in... 
                                                                                                                                           
once we shift to a Buddhist context there are further problems with the role of desire here.  I thank 
Charles Goodman for sharing his thoughts on this, in correspondence. 
30
 They might also be troubled by certain omissions in my account.  Mādhyamikas do not merely treat 
belief in ultimate moral value as erroneous; they add that such belief can also be harmful, resulting in a 
subtle form of upādāna (attachment) focused on the ideal of ‘ultimate value’.  The realist views I 
consider below need not reject this further claim, and it might even lead them to recommend a self-
effacing attitude to the ultimate in practice – though the ultimate would remain in place, at some level 
of philosophical consciousness.  Siderits (2003) considers this problem as it arises in relation to 
ultimate truth, and likewise leaves it open as to whether this is sufficient grounds for rejecting realism. 
31
 It should be emphasized that I have not invoked the idea that rational egoism might be morally or 
socially dangerous; after all, even if it were dangerous in some way, that would not make it false.  The 
point above is not about our defencelessness in the event of egoism spreading, but rather about the 
pointlessness of Buddhist ethical values if there turned out to be no real flaw or mistake in adopting an 
egoist creed.  If every person in the world but one became a rational egoist, this one person’s call for 
compassion would be no more than a fist banging on a table, so to speak.  (A Humean objection – that 
there is no chance of so many people becoming so psychologically different than they are now – would 
address only the ‘is’ of how people are, not the ‘ought’ of what they ought not to do; and since 
Humeans themselves stress this is-ought distinction, they have reason to re-examine this objection.) 
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emptiness’.  Emptiness is the ultimate truth  (or at any rate, an insight that is gained 
through perfected wisdom), and here it is said to ground an impartial form of 
compassion.  Though a psychological interpretation of this ‘grounding’ is possible, it 
is more natural to read “grounded in emptiness” as meaning: uniquely justified by the 
truth of emptiness.  Instead of an open-ended range of mutually incompatible value 
options, there is at least one value (mahākaruṇā) that follows necessarily and 
justifiably from apprehending the truth of emptiness.  And it is difficult not to read 
this normative implication as deriving a special degree of justification from the fact 
that ultimate truth (or perfected wisdom) is the starting point. 
Finnigan and Tanaka continue as follows: 
 
Śāntideva... distinguishes aspirational from engaged bodhicitta.  The first is a sincere 
aspiration grounded in compassion and an inferential understanding of emptiness and 
dependent origination to attain awakening for the sake of sentient beings.  The second is a 
spontaneous virtuous engagement mediated by a direct apprehension of emptiness and 
dependent origination.  The second emerges only at the end of the bodhisattva path 
inspired by the first.  While Śāntideva recognizes the value of the aspiration to great 
compassion and a unified set of bodhisattva virtues grounded in apprehension of the two 
truths for the cultivation of virtue, he nevertheless recognizes a great difference between 
aspiring to this great compassion and its actualization. (2011b, 229-230) 
 
And one page later, they add (without the mediation of Śāntideva, and thus perhaps 
with more explicit endorsement): 
 
The bodhisattva precepts and their role as active values require a robust engagement with 
the conventional world. (231, my italics) 
 
Even more clearly in this latter claim, the term ‘require’ is contributing a robust 
normative element to this account of bodhisattva ethics.  The chain of justification 
seems to be this: an understanding of emptiness requires compassion, and compassion 
requires moral engagement in the conventional world.  (Requirement is clearly not 
used here in an instrumental sense, and so is presumably used in a different normative 
sense – that of justifying.)  There seems to be no room here for allowing non-
compassion-oriented practices to be seen as valid – no room, that is, even to be seen 
as ‘valid’ in the sense of valid-relative-to-some-other-understanding.  Whatever 
becomes of relativism, though, there is perhaps room for an error theory.  But an error 
theory about whatever might be thought justified by an understanding or 
apprehension of emptiness (and in particular an error theory about the justification of 
compassion) would seem to undermine this whole approach to ethics. 
Finnigan and Tanaka’s recourse to ‘grounding’, meanwhile, is surely not a mere 
slip-up that could have been avoided by a different choice of words.  They naturally 
wish to address how insights gained through enlightenment can guide ethical and 
soteriological considerations.  For the most part, this is only implicit, but as we have 
just seen, it does surface at times.  Part of the trouble here may involve the concept of 
‘guidance’.  (And it is only trouble in terms of the lack of coherence with their overall 
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anti-realist approach; without this anti-realism, their thoughts on normative guidance 
would have been germane to a different approach to Buddhist ethics that I portray 
favorably in the next section.)  I am arguing that this concept of ‘guidance’ must be 
normative in this context, and not merely psychological.  And I have been arguing 
that the insight(s) of enlightenment, to be normative, must be action-guiding in a 
robust justificatory sense.  But this is what Finnigan and Tanaka’s Mādhyamika 
appears to rule out. 
Something could hardly qualify as a distinctively Buddhist approach to ethics, one 
might think, if its basic tenets are not somehow justified either in light of a conception 
of ultimate truth, or in light of an enlightened perspective in which putative ultimate 
truths are demystified or deconstructed.  This should be less controversial than the 
already uncontroversial observation that something could hardly qualify as a form of 
Buddhist ethics if it did not include a forthright affirmation of the moral importance 
of karuṇā.  In any case, the prospect of a robust justification of the latter, in light of 
the former, remains entirely open.  Such justification has not been shown to be 
impossible or incoherent; on the contrary, it may often be presupposed, at least in 
some common ways of articulating Buddhist moral values. 
 
3. BUDDHIST MORAL REALISM AND PROSPECTS  
FOR DEFENDING THE BODHISATTVA PATH 
I have argued that many standard construals of Buddhist ethics tacitly presuppose 
moral realism, even some that try explicitly to disavow it.  But I have not argued in 
favor of moral realism itself.  The status of karuṇā – in both ethics and soteriology – 
is one of the few constants across Buddhist traditions; its pervasiveness strengthens 
the claim that Buddhism in general requires moral realism.  Yet there is still the 
option of applying modus tollens to a fuller articulation of that claim.  Some might 
wish, that is, to argue that moral realism is philosophically unacceptable, and 
therefore, taking a version of the above claim as a given, it might follow that the 
extravagant vindications of compassion in certain forms of Buddhism would need to 
be revised or reconceptualized in some way.  (Indeed, some might say that this is 
precisely Madhyamaka’s aim: to rectify this with a kind of restorative 
conceptualization along with a therapeutic kind of deconceptualization.)  In any case, 
a vindication of compassion involves first-order ethics.  We should now ask: do all 
Buddhist texts that broach second-order ethics (i.e. meta-ethics) express or entail 
moral anti-realism, or are there exceptions in certain traditions of Buddhist 
philosophy?  Are there realist options for Buddhist ethicists?
32
 
                                                 
32
 Since, as just noted, I am not offering a defence of moral realism here, this inquiry should not be 
seen as motivated by a prior commitment to moral realism. It is worth noting, however, the recent turn 
among philosophers not only towards moral realism in general, but even towards the strong form that 
accepts the idea of irreducible, non-natural normative truth.  The arguably weaker form, meta-ethical 
naturalism, has been famous for its revival since the pioneering works of Peter Railton, Nicholas 
Sturgeon and Richard Boyd in the 1980s; but the stronger form has flourished more recently, even 
among those sometimes presumed least likely to endorse it, such as consequentialists and 
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We should not underestimate the option of introducing a novel philosophical view 
(such as an updated form of moral realism) to enrich Buddhist doctrine, even though 
it has no praecursor in sacred text or in commentary.  If philosophers had not been 
willing to do this at various times in history, Buddhist philosophy would never have 
evolved.  Nonetheless, starting from scratch may not be necessary, since there seem 
to be at least two strains of moral realism in Buddhist thought, one in the Theravāda 
tradition and one in the Mahāyāna.  Moreover, reflecting on the scope for moral 
realism in Buddhist ethics opens up a new line of response to Paul Williams’s well-
known charge that Śāntideva “destroyed the bodhisattva path” – a worrying charge to 
Buddhist ethicists, since it focuses on what many regard as a fundamental insight 
linking anātman to moral impartiality.  I close this section by sketching the sort of 
response that a Buddhist moral realist might offer to Williams. 
 First, let us consider one Theravāda perspective that may qualify as a form of 
moral realism.  P.D. Premasiri has defended what he calls a naturalist approach to 
defining moral properties, drawing on themes in the Pāli Canon.33  He argues that, in 
much of the Canon, kusala refers to an objective property – the property of causing 
beneficial consequences.  This analysis is more apt than one might think, because 
while eschewing metaphysical naturalism, it does indeed correspond to one form of 
meta-ethical naturalism, on which true moral claims are made true by causal 
relations. 
Such causal relations, however, are samskrta (conditioned) rather than asamskrta 
(unconditioned).  Premasiri is content to confine ethics to the realm of the former.  
We might worry, however, that these ‘conditioned’ relations can account only for 
conditional truths.  For example, if a precept is violated, then a psychological effect is 
produced; and the putative normative truth that corresponds to this fact is the truth 
that if one wishes to avoid such an effect, then one should honor the precepts.  Such 
conditional truths are better known in ethics as relative truths – in this case, the claim 
that one should honor the precepts is true relative to a psychological (or 
soteriological) aim or standard.  The conditioned nature of Premasiri’s naturalistic 
truths may thus lead to yet another form of relativism (depending on how the value of 
aims/standards is explained). 
                                                                                                                                           
particularists.  Kagan (2000 & 2009) and Parfit (2011) are among those sympathetic with 
consequentialism.  Dancy (2004) defends a particularist form of robust realism, and McNaughton and 
Rawling (2003) come close to a similar style of particularism.  The strong, non-reductionist form of 
moral realism has also been defended recently by many others who do not follow McDowell’s 
Aristotelian approach – see Audi (2005), Cuneo (2007), Enoch (2011), Hampton (1998), Oddie (2005), 
Shafer-Landau (2003), and Wedgwood (2007).  Unlike those who adopt Railton’s (2003) naturalist 
approach, most of these philosophers conclude that normative reasons, being ‘external’ reasons, are 
independent of belief, desire, deliberation and argumentation – and thus all the more objective for 
being irreducible to any natural properties that may play a role in human psychology. 
33
 Premasiri (1997) draws on C. Rhys Davids’s (1978) interpretation of normative language in the Pāli 
Canon.  In The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, Keown also recommends a naturalist form of moral realism 
(albeit with a different understanding of the concept of kusala), but defends it only indirectly, via 
reflections on the strengths of Aristotle’s teleology (Keown 2001, 21, 64, 232). 
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Insofar as this remains to be seen, Premasiri’s approach may qualify as a proposal 
for a kind of Buddhist moral realism.
34
  Insofar as the worry is justified, though, we 
might consider whether there are Mahāyāna perspectives that offer more 
‘unconditional’ forms of moral realism.35  We have considered only the Madhyamaka 
school so far here, and noted its tendency towards moral (and perhaps global) anti-
realism.  But there appear to be the outlines of an alternative, non-reductionist and 
non-naturalist account of normative truth in some of the texts associated with a 
different Mahāyāna tradition, the Yogācāra school. 
There are two initial steps that help us to see this possibility.  First of all, we 
should take seriously Jay Garfield’s conclusion that the Madhyamaka and the 
Yogācāra philosophical orientations are more at odds than many modern Buddhist 
traditions have supposed.  As Garfield argues, the Yogācāra’s quietist dimension is 
quite different from Madhyamaka’s, and its claim to a “mystical intuition of a 
transcendent realm” reflects a metaphysical realism that Mādhyamikas reject 
(Garfield 2002b, 182).  Secondly, the normative claims we should consider first are 
not those associated with moral precepts, but those concerning the value of nirvāṇa.  
The key normative claim here is axiological rather than deontic – in particular, that 
nirvāṇa is a (supremely) worthy goal.  Yogācārins believed not only that this goal is 
so important that it should guide one’s life-choices, but also that our affirmations of it 
are guided by a sense of ultimate justification.  The goal and our belief(s) about it, as 
much as its downstream moral implications, are clearly normative.  But did the 
Yogācārins have a meta-theoretical understanding of this normativity?36 
Insofar as they thought of nirvāṇa as inherently normative (anuttara, kuśala, etc.), 
their reflections on it suggest that they did have such an understanding.  David Burton 
has recently defended something along these lines, echoing Garfield in arguing that 
Yogācārins made positive claims about ultimate truth that the Madhyamaka tradition 
did not – and does not – accept.  If nirvāṇa is a worthy goal, this is an ultimate truth, 
                                                 
34
 Railton (2003) defends a similar kind of naturalism, while hoping to fend off moral relativism.  
Horgan and Timmons (1991, 2006) – themselves naturalists – have argued that such hopes cannot be 
sustained, insofar as moral semantics takes that cognitivist-naturalist form. 
35
 One could interpret Steven Collins (1998) as showing, in effect, that a Theravāda approach can 
support axiologically realist claims about nirvāṇa – similar to the ones I am about to consider.  Moving 
from axiology to morality, Mahāyāna texts seem to stress a more ambitious commitment to moral 
impartiality and moral engagement.  The Mahāyāna treats egoism as an error (like the Pāli suttas (cf. n. 
24)), and as an even deeper kind of mistake than that of indulging taṇhā/tṛṣṇā (perhaps unlike those 
suttas).  Explaining what makes this an error is a major aim of Mahāyāna philosophy, particularly in 
commentaries rather than canonical texts.  (And philosophically, this latter point deserves special 
notice.  We should not expect canonical scripture to address meta-ethics any more than we should 
expect ancient Greek philosophers to address hermeneutics or metalogic; but many Mahāyānists are 
willing to let writers such as Śāntideva or Vasubandhu lead the way here, without expecting canonical 
scripture to have all the answers.) 
36
 I switch here to the past tense, because unlike the Madhyamaka, the Yogācāra tradition has no living 
branch of practitioners who self-identify primarily as Yogācārins. 
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not a conventional truth; or at any rate so thought Yogācārins such as Vasubandhu.37  
Their mysticism was starkly opposed to Madhyamaka anti-realism; after all, it is 
arguably only possible to have a mystical understanding of something when that thing 
is sufficiently real that human language and concepts might fail to measure up to it.
38
  
Both the nature of nirvāṇa and its value are captured in truths that are ultimate truths.  
And this value – and its importance to all beings – accounts for objective truths about 
the value of a bodhisattva’s good works (and of their vows to accomplish such 
works).  Since these truths are said to lie beyond our language and even our concepts, 
this may not be an epistemically robust form of moral realism; but it is a form of 
moral realism nonetheless, and a form that appears to be non-reductionist and non-
naturalist.
39
 
It is also worth emphasizing that, as this implies, Yogācārins were not moral 
relativists.  In fact, their well-known critique of what they saw as Madhyamaka 
nihilism can be developed into a critique of both meta-normative relativism in general 
and moral relativism in particular.
40
  Not only do the Yogācārins consider collective 
nirvāṇa to be a universally valid ideal; they argue that it could not coherently be 
considered anything else.  Their interest in the latter issue reveals how meta-ethical 
reflections on truth and objectivity would become integral to their philosophical 
system.  (The former claim, when expressed in terms of the ultimate truth versus 
conventional truth distinction, is equally meta-ethical, but can also be seen as 
following from various straightforwardly normative statements, e.g. in sutras rather 
than philosophical works.)  This fundamental non-relativism did not prevent 
Yogācārins from retaining the Mahāyāna emphasis on upāya (skillful means) and a 
qualified instrumentalism in ethics; as I explain further below, goal-relative 
                                                 
37
 See Burton (2004, 93-95), on Yogācāra’s departures from Madhyamaka anti-realism, and on the 
implications for Yogācāra idealizations of emptiness and nirvāṇa (2004, 131, 142 ff.).  Cf. n. 43 
below, on Vasubandhu. 
38
 Familiar paradoxes about mystical inexpressibility arise here: if the insight is wholly inexpressible, 
can we describe it as concerning something ‘real’?  Nonetheless, the point made in the text could be 
put in formal rather than substantive terms.  When we enumerate the various possible forms of anti-
realism, ineffabilist mysticism is generally not counted among them (contrast scepticism, which has a 
more contested intermediate status).  For instance, it is rightly contrasted with debunking forms of non-
cognitivism – since, if mysticism were to be considered a form of non-cognitivism, it would have to be 
called a ‘non-cognitivism’ that is somehow ‘about something’.  For that ‘something’ to be beyond the 
limits of language and cognition, it could not be a mere projection or presupposition of language or 
thought (though saying even this much may indeed be paradoxical).  In any case, if mysticism is 
neither scepticism nor anti-realism, it may have to qualify as ‘realism’ – keeping in mind the 
qualification in n. 1, inter alia – whatever we might say or refuse to say about the ‘real’.  I thank one of 
the journal’s anonymous referees for prompting me to clarify this point. 
39
 Yogācārins might be reductionist about other things, e.g. the nature of selfhood or personhood, but 
not about the normative dimension of pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (or, perhaps equivalently, the value of 
nirvāṇa).  Moreover, if a case can be made that this dimension is irreducibly normative, then the 
spectre of a problematic ‘is-ought’ transition can be warded off.  Even though moral guidance would 
be based on normative truth, the truth would not be of a kind that resides problematically on the ‘is’ 
side of this divide.  By contrast, Premasiri’s naturalist approach continues to be haunted by this 
spectre. 
40
 For a summary of the Yogācāra critique of Madhyamaka, see Williams (2009, 86 ff.). 
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deliberation is not ethically relativist if the value of the ultimate goal is not relative to 
varying standards or perspectives.
41
  Meanwhile, however, unlike contemporary 
forms of moral realism that rely on instrumentalist considerations, the Yogācāra 
approach involves no ontological commitment to naturalism. 
In fact, naturalism may not even be an option for Yogācārins, who have 
traditionally been interpreted as anti-realists about physical world discourse.  Both 
Garfield and Burton favor this traditional reading.
42
  However, unlike Madhyamaka 
philosophers, Yogācārins remain metaphysical realists about certain mental 
phenomena, as well as about some of the moral implications of the value of collective 
nirvāṇa.  It is the latter point that helps distinguish Yogācāra axiology not only from 
the Madhyamaka but also from a Theravāda view that combines Premasiri’s account 
of conditioned moral phenomena with an account of unconditioned nirvāṇa, qua 
value or ideal.  That is, Premasiri’s account and the Yogācāra approach might at first 
seem compatible; but the Yogācāra draws a closer connection between the 
soteriological value of nirvāṇa and the moral value of helping all sentient beings 
attain it, such that insights about the latter (and about the nature of bodhisattva vows) 
could plausibly be regarded as ultimate truths.
43
 
Drawing such a close connection between morality and ultimate truth will be 
controversial.  However, my aim here is simply to show that at least a couple of 
Buddhist philosophical traditions seem to steer clear of moral anti-realism.  Showing 
this would at least correct any impression that the problems discussed earlier threaten 
to undermine Buddhist ethics in general.  In fact, in closing, it is worth mentioning a 
possible defence of one major Buddhist moral argument, a defence that is made 
possible by noting the scope for moral realism in Buddhist ethics.  That moral 
                                                 
41
 I thank one of the journal’s anonymous referees for suggesting that I emphasize how non-relativism 
(about the status of nirvāṇa) and pervasive means-ends deliberation can thus be reconciled.  It may be 
only in Madhyamaka philosophy that such a reconciliation is not available, partly for the reasons noted 
in section I, and partly in light of its Nāgārjunian debunking of nirvāṇa qua svabhava.  I have 
hesitated, however – e.g. in n. 28 – to generalize about all Madhyamaka philosophy.  In fact, it is in a 
discussion of Madhyamaka soteriology, in Kapstein (2001, 217) that we find one of the more 
intriguing equations of ultimate truth with ethical-cum-soteriological truth.  I am not sure the passage 
Kapstein cites, from Prajñākaramati, really supports this equation; but his suggestion is philosophically 
promising, and as I am arguing here, would at least be at home in expositions of some other Mahāyāna 
traditions. 
42
 Dan Lusthaus (2002), among others, has challenged this reading.  For a summary and critique of 
these challenges, see Garfield (2002d, 155-159). 
43
 The last verse of Vasubandhu’s Tri-svabhāva-nirdeśa provides one example: “Through the 
perception of the radiant / And through achieving the three supreme Buddha-bodies / And through 
possessing Bodhi: / Having achieved this, the sage will benefit him or herself and others” (Jay 
Garfield’s translation, in Garfield (2002c, 151)).  Kochumuttom’s translation of the last line is: “seeing 
the meaning of oneself and others” (Kochumuttom 1982, 126), which may support my construal in 
terms of moral insight.  (Of course, one sees through the self-other distinction, ontologically speaking; 
but ethically, one can see an ‘all’ beyond oneself.)  In another work, the Madhyānta-Vibhāga-Bhāṣya, 
Vasubandhu says: “Ultimate truth is to be known as existing because of the one fulfilled own-being, 
only... It is ultimate as an object because Suchness is the object of ultimate knowledge... It is ultimate 
as an attainment because its attainment is equal to Nirvāna, which is the ultimate aim.  It is ultimate as 
practise, because it is the Path, which has the ultimate aim” (Anacker 1984, 236-237). 
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argument is based on reasoning that is often presumed central to much of Buddhist 
thought, but is articulated most explicitly by Śāntideva (1995) in his 
Bodhicaryāvatāra (8: 90-103).  Although Śāntideva came from the Madhyamaka 
tradition, there is a praecursor of his argument in an important Yogācāra text – not 
surprisingly, since the argument is essentially that anātman (no-self) requires 
impartial concern for the welfare of all beings.
44
 
In his book Altruism and Reality, Paul Williams critiques this argument in a 
chapter provocatively sub-titled “How Śāntideva Destroyed the Bodhisattva Path”.  
The Madhyamaka approach as a whole may be one of Williams’s targets, but there is 
nothing specifically Madhyamaka that he singles out as philosophically undermining 
the bodhisattva ideal.  Rather, he identifies the general Buddhist acceptance of 
anātman (no-self) as being responsible for this.  This is not the place for a full 
discussion of Williams’s rich exploration of the philosophical problems that arise 
here.  We should just notice that his position is that a sine qua non of moral thinking 
is belief in bounded, diachronically continuous selves or subjects.  Kantians might 
agree with this, but many other ethical theorists would not.  Some anti-realists would 
also not agree; but arguably the strongest challenge to Williams’s position comes 
from the kind of moral or ethical realist who holds that certain sorts of valuable 
experience are so objectively valuable that a subject’s diachronic status will often 
make little or no difference to the value of such experiences.  Two completely 
different kinds of realist fit this description: objectivist utilitarians on the one hand, 
and on the other, Buddhists who think of the ‘experience’ of nirvāṇa in this way.  A 
realism of the latter kind could explain how a bodhisattva’s moral aspiration may be 
justified regardless of how the metaphysics of personhood turns out.  But if it turns 
out that anātman is correct and that ethically salient psychological boundaries are as 
much intrapersonal as interpersonal (i.e. that there is no ethically relevant difference 
between the diachronically intrapersonal and the interpersonal, if we can even make 
this distinction at all), there is no reason why the new psychological framework 
should not structure or restructure moral considerations that apply in any case – moral 
considerations such as the importance of overall long-term well-being.  Williams 
seems to have overlooked how a moral or ethical realism of this kind can neutralize 
his concerns about morally nihilistic tendencies in the anātman framework – 
overlooking this, perhaps, because the kinds of Buddhist philosophy he mainly 
discusses are anti-realist not only about metaphysical selfhood but also about putative 
moral properties. 
It is not the anātman premise, then, that threatens to undermine the bodhisattva 
ideal.  It could be argued that it does not even pose any acute problems, unless agent-
relative moral principles are taken for granted – something even Williams doubts 
(along with Goodman and Clayton), in Śāntideva’s case.  What may pose problems, 
however, for karuṇā, dāna and bodhicitta qua ideals, is moral anti-realism – whether 
                                                 
44
 In Part V of Vasubandhu’s Madhyānta-Vibhāga-Bhāṣya, where he says: “The highest form [of 
practise] through continuity is to be known through fulfillment of all the pāramitās of giving, etc. 
towards all sentient beings without any interruption, the ability for which comes with the confidence 
that ‘self’ and ‘others’ are really the same” (Anacker 1984, 257). 
48 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 4.2 (2013)  DAVIS 
these are problems for defenders of Śāntideva or only certain other Mādhyamikas.  
However, we have seen that Buddhist ethics has realist options, some of which are 
‘indigenous’, that can – for better or worse – construe these ideals as having a non-
relative value, and restore a kind of normative significance that is not only action-
guiding but also value-guided in the justificatory sense. 
Returning to the question with which I began this section – whether Buddhist 
ethics ‘requires’ moral realism – it is worth qualifying the claim that there are realist 
‘options’ for Buddhist ethics.  Three conclusions might be tempting for a Buddhist 
who rejects moral anti-realism: (1) Buddhist ethics is based on some form of moral 
realism; (2) Some traditions of Buddhist ethics accept a form or forms of moral 
realism; and (3) Buddhist ethics is indirectly committed to moral realism.  I have 
argued only for the latter two: (2) on exegetical grounds, and (3) on philosophical 
grounds.  This helps to accommodate, and to respect, the avowals of anti-realism that 
can be found in the work of many Buddhist ethicists.  Nonetheless, realism and anti-
realism might not be equally viable options, philosophically speaking, for Buddhists.  
In saying that Buddhist ethics ‘has realist options’, I meant rather that when 
Buddhists take seriously the need for a realist framework, there are options for 
fulfilling that need that derive from (different streams of) the Buddhist tradition itself. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In closing, it is worth distinguishing my conclusions from other claims that might 
(only superficially) resemble them.  One, which only needs a brief reprise here, is the 
claim that some form of moral realism is philosophically the most plausible and 
defensible meta-ethical view.  Rather than defending that claim, I have only argued 
that many forms of Buddhist ethics and soteriology presuppose that some form of 
moral realism can be availed of, to make sense of their normative insights. 
But two other claims are worth mentioning – as tempting but misleading 
construals of my conclusions – one more specific than my conclusions, and one more 
general.  The specific claim would be that not only can the general goal(s) of 
Buddhist ethics be vindicated by moral realism, but also the specific precepts of sīla 
(such as those against killing, theft, and so on), i.e. that these can be treated as 
absolute normative truths.  The more general claim would be that Madhyamaka 
philosophy, again despite its best interests, flirts with normative collapse not only in 
meta-ethics and ethics, but also in other areas where justificatory criteria play a role, 
such as epistemology.  From some of my remarks, it may have seemed that I was 
merely repeating the old concern that Madhyamaka philosophy leaves all of our 
belief-forming practices in a ‘dismal slough’ – that is, in a position where even 
ordinary truths cannot be distinguished from ordinary falsehoods, or from the kinds of 
obvious myth-making, wishful-thinking, etc., that cognitive improvement (not to 
mention enlightenment) tries to transcend.  The specific claim would have us build on 
moral realism to arrive at specific moral knowledge.  The general claim would have 
us expand the scope of our critique of Madhyamaka anti-realism. 
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Stopping short of endorsing the specific claim, let us recall that it does not follow 
from a realism about the moral value of compassion (and/or overall well-being) that 
any particular precept has an unconditionally binding character.  It would be 
compatible with a generic moral realism of the kind considered here to treat a 
provisional acceptance of precepts as involving a generally upāyic disposition while 
also acknowledging wise exceptions to precepts as equally upāyic (i.e. skillful 
means).  In a sense, the value of precepts might be relative: it is only relative to the 
ultimate goal of compassionate, collective engagement that it can be worthwhile to 
honor a precept, and that same goal can sometimes justify not honoring a precept.  
But if the importance of the ultimate goal is non-relative, then the relativity of 
precept-applicability does not amount to moral relativism.  (I have suggested, for 
example, that moral realism would fit well with Goodman’s first-order moral theory, 
which relativizes precept-applicability in this way; i.e., while his theory elevates the 
significance of teleological priorities, it would subordinate the precepts to those 
priorities.) 
 Regarding the general claim, I will merely point out that it invokes a much more 
general interpretation of Madhyamaka philosophy than I have offered in the form of a 
critique of a few perspectives on Madhyamaka moral philosophy.  It is true that a 
refutation of moral anti-realism would also be a refutation of global anti-realism; and 
thus, for those attracted to global anti-realism, the stakes are high in meta-ethics.  But 
I offer no general interpretation of Madhyamaka epistemology here, and am not 
assuming that it amounts to global anti-realism. 
 Finally, some might worry that an appeal to moral realism could serve as a Trojan 
horse for a set of alien expectations about the need for generalized ethical principles 
or theories in Buddhist ethics.  Although I addressed this worry at the outset (noting 
that moral realists can be particularists, and that some in fact are), it may be worth 
acknowledging that there is a connection here, albeit nothing as covert as the worry, 
expressed in that form, suggests.  Meta-ethical anti-realists can seek out theoretical 
interpretations of Buddhist texts, as Goodman’s project shows.  But the inclination to 
do this may be stronger among moral realists, even among those whose moral realism 
is epistemically modest.  Such realists do not claim to know which moral claims are 
true; and since it then becomes important to compare a range of candidates for moral 
truth, it is inevitable that any sufficiently wide range will include some highly general 
principles, as well as less ‘principled’ collections of moral beliefs.  This then makes it 
natural to devote a large part of any intercultural comparative analysis to comparisons 
guided by familiar theoretical frameworks.  This should not load the dice in favor of 
Western ethical theories; but it can make them useful analytical tools, even in 
Buddhist ethics.  Whether the forms of moral realism and anti-realism familiar in 
contemporary Western philosophy also serve as analytical tools in this area, and 
perhaps no more than that, is a question I leave for another occasion. 
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